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The availability of a unique data set of financially distressed firms enabled this study to 
apply the dynamic capital structure adjustment model to a study of capital structure. In 
addition, the factors driving capital structure adjustment of financially distressed and of 
healthy firms were estimated. The results identified 13 significant variables, which 
included many macroeconomic variables previously not studied, thus evidence is 
produced of the impact of macroeconomic factors on capital structure for the first time. 
We also estimated the adjustment parameters using a new dynamic adjustment model 
applied to an unbalanced panel data set of distressed and healthy firms. It is found that 
the adjustment parameters are different in the short term and long term. These new 
findings add to the capital structure literature.  
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How Capital Structure Adjusts Dynamically during Financial Crisis 
 
 
A principal research question in corporate finance is “How do firms adjust their capital 
structure to finance their operations”? It will ideal to observe this behavior if sample of 
sample of distressed firms can be used. This is what this paper attempts to do. 
Researchers have also raised another question: “What is the correlation between capital 
structure and potential factors”? A classic article by Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
provided some answers and contemporary researchers continue to address these same 
questions using newer ideas and methods of investigation.  
In this paper, we report new findings obtained from the use of a population of 
financially distressed firms – a unique data set - which were matched with healthy firms 
to address these same questions. In so doing, our use of the dynamic adjustment model 
(as in Ozkan, 2001 and Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1998) enabled us to first test the 
dynamic adjustment proposition and also to identify - both firm-specific and 
macroeconomic - factors driving the capital structure changes. Thus, the paper reports 
new findings by using a privately available unique data set of distressed firms. The 
distressed firms were identified by regulatory authorities in a major rescue attempt to 
save these firms from potential bankruptcy after these firms were adversely affected by 
the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis. For each distressed firm, we matched a healthy firm 
by industry and size.  
  Gilson (1989) reveals that high leverage is one important characteristic of 
financially distressed firms. This suggests that capital structure has important bearing on 
the financial distress of a firm. Lee, Jong-Wha et al. (2000) also observed that the 
Chaebol firms, which were identified in Korea as financially distressed, had high   4
leverage and these firms resorted more to short-term loans compared with the non-
Chaebol firms. Due to these characteristics, the Chaebol firms became financially 
vulnerable just prior to the Asian financial crisis in Korea. Bongini, Ferri and Hahm 
(2000) studied the Korean listed companies before and after the financial crisis and 
found that highly leverage firms were more likely to become bankrupt than less 
leveraged firms, a findings consistent with bankruptcy prediction literature. Nikolaos et 
al. (2002) found a strong negative impact of capital structure on firm’s profitability. 
This again suggests that a highly levered firm is prone to financial distress or 
bankruptcy. By applying known theoretical and empirical model of relationships 
between capital structure and financial distress, we investigate in this study both 
financial and economic determinants of capital structure changes, which is made 
possible by the use of a new unbalanced panel regression method, which is used for the 
first time to study capital structure.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is to provide a brief 
background to the Asian financial crisis.  In Section 3 is to be found a quick review of 
the literature relevant to the dynamic capital structure ideas. The unique data set, test 
models, and hypotheses are explained in Section 4. The empirical results are discussed 
in Section 5 and the conclusions are in Section 6. 
 
1. Financial Crises and Corporate Distress/Failure 
To measure the potentially differing speeds of capital structure adjustment of distressed 
and healthy firms in an economy, we searched for data sets in financially distressed 
countries (Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia). It was only in Malaysia, where an 
official committee in the ministry of finance was given the responsibility to identify the 
distressed firms that could be salvaged, that we were able to find a large and complete   5
                                                
data set for the period 1986-2001 of all 91 distressed firms listed on the stock market. 
The 1997-8 Asian financial crisis perpetrated large-scale failures of hitherto profitable 
firms, thus by the year 1999, there were identifiable firms that would go to receivership 
if not rescued. The financial crisis exposed the financial weakness of firms, especially 
of the firms with high leverage, which were classified under financial distress category. 
The committee adopted a guideline known as the “Practice Notes 4/2001 (PN4)” for 
identifying distressed firms to be rescued and those to be permitted to fail: see IMF, 
1997.
1 Some scholars (e.g. Ghani, 1999) provided evidence suggesting how these firms 
were adversely affected by the crisis.  
Two aspects were noted in published reports: see Figure 1. Prior to the crisis, the 
debt ratio of distressed firms was 0.167 compared with 0.108 for healthy firms: the 
difference was not significant. Second, after the crisis had done its damage, debt level 
increased to 0.627-0.740 for the distressed cases: 0.350 to 0.423 for the healthy firms. 
The difference in debt ratio is significant. Further, statistics show that the proportion of 
short-term debt dominated the distressed firms, increasing to about 0.509-0.669. In 
contrast, the healthy firms’ share of short-term debt was 0.300. Argenti (1976) points to 
the potential for instability when short-term debt begins to increase to these levels.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
An important limitation of prior research on the determination of capital structure is that 
there is no study of the impact of severe financial crisis that led to some healthy firms 
becoming financially distressed. The availability of data in an economy undergoing 
abnormal financial impact of a systemic disturbance enables us to obtain new findings 
to be reported on this missing area of research.     
 
 
1 International Monetary Fund (1997). World Economic Outlook, October, 1997.   6
2. Theories and Evidence  
Theories 
Excellent surveys on capital structure theories and empirical results can be found in 
Myers (1984), Harris and Raviv (1991) and Ranjan and Zingales (1995) among others. 
The traditional view is that capital structure could influence the cost of capital and 
thereby affect the value of firm. It holds that the moderate or reasonable use of leverage 
will reduce the overall cost of capital initially and hence also increase value. When 
leverage becomes too high, beyond an optimal point, the cost of capital will begin to 
increase and hence the value will decline. There is no precise identification of how to 
measure either a moderate or reasonable or optimal capital structure. Some have 
accepted a moving average of historical capital structure: others have accepted an 
industry ratio (Ariff and Lau, 1996).  
Hence the traditional view of optimality of capital structure is still largely 
unproven with direct evidence. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that if a firm’s 
interest cost is not tax-deductible, its value will be independent of its capital structure 
changes: they then introduced tax deductibility of interest cost and developed a 
proposition that says that the value of firm is monotonically increasing with capital 
structure increases. Later writers brought in the agency and bankruptcy costs and 
showed that the value of a firm must decline when its debt reaches an optimal level. 
There is a continuing debate as to whether tax effect is in fact offset by the firm 
engaging in a number of tax-offsetting activities: Miller (1977).  
 
Factors Correlated with Capital Structure 
The following section explains briefly the variables used and the expected 
relationships.    7
 study.
3 
                                                
The variables and the expected relationships. The dependent variable is the 
debt ratio, Dit, which is defined as the ratio of book value of long-term debt and the 
market value of equity plus the market value of long-term debts.
2  In calculating 
leverage ratio, both short-term debt and long-term debt are distinguished to enables us 
to examine which of the two constitutes a significant proportion of the total debt 
employed by public listed companies. Six measures of leverage, following Titman and 
Wessel, 1988, are used in the
(Insert Table 1) 
Table 1 is summary of the literature examining the factors correlated with capital 
structure. As is evident, there are both firm-specific factors (Xj in our model to be 
specified) and macro-economic variables (Yt) that are suggested by the sources quoted 
in the table as likely to be correlated. Three of the 12 firm-specific variables are new: 
the study of distressed firms requires the use of these ratios. These variables were used 
by the regulatory authorities to identify firms for rescue operations. The remaining nine 
variables are literature-based.  
Capital structure studies seldom included macroeconomic variables for two 
reasons: studies using cross-sectional regressions would find the use of time series 
difficult at best; in studying firms that had not undergone financial crisis, 
macroeconomic factors are less likely to be of importance. For the cases of distressed 
firms, these macroeconomic variables are pertinent and need to be included. Because of 
the need to use both cross-sectional and time series data, we also had to resort to newer 
 
2 This approach is in line with many prior studies which have used book value of debt in measuring 
leverage (Friend and Lang, 1988; Titman and Wessels, 1988). In addition, Bowman (1980) argues that 
even if the market value of debt is an accurate measure of leverage, the use of book value of debt is not 
expected to distort leverage ratios. 
3 Six measures are, short-term debt (BV and MV), Long-term debt (BV and MV) and Total debt (BV and 
MV)   8
method of fully using the panel data. To maximize the use of all available data, the 
panel regression done in this study resorted to a recently developed unbalanced panel 
regression method: see Ozkan (2001). 
  
Assessment of Literature 
It is evident, from the very cursory review of the large literature on this topic thus far, 
there is no consensus on what constitutes optimal capital structure in application 
although there is strong evidence from many studies of firm-specific factors being 
correlated with capital structure. Ozkan (2001) suggests that a firm adjusts its capital 
structure dynamically against its own target capital structure. It is further suggested that 
this adjustment process changes over time at different speeds of adjustment. Prior 
studies on capital structure have seldom used key macroeconomic factors: the exception 
is Drobetz, Wanzenreid (2004), which used interest rate and inflation.   
The main reason for excluding macroeconomic factors is the use of cross-
sectional regression, which does not permit the macroeconomic time series data to be 
included at the same time. Further, most studies used balanced panel data, which 
necessarily limits the use of all available data in a panel regression. A recent 
development of unbalanced panel regression procedure (Ozkan, 2001), if applied to any 
unbalanced capital structure data set, would enable researchers to overcome this 
limitation. To study financially distressed firms, as in this study, the macroeconomic 
variables are very important besides the special firm-specific financial variables already 
identified and discussed in the literature.  
  
 
   9
3. Test Models 
As discussed in the previous section, the target debt level for a firm D
*
it depends on 
certain factors explained by theory and by country specific factor and overall economic 
conditions. This can be expressed: 
it t i it i it Y X D ε γ β β + + + = ∑ ∑ 1
*
   (1) 
Where firms are represented by subscript i=1,….N, time by t= 1,…T, firms specific 
variables are represented by Xi and macroeconomics related variables are represented 
by Yt. Leverage is defined differently and represented by 7 different specifications.  
When considering the existence of transaction costs, firms do not automatically 
adjust their debt levels but instead follow a target adjustment process. The static tradeoff 
theory argued that managers are seeking optimal capital structures. Random events 
would bump them away from it, and they would then have to work gradually back. If 
the optimum debt ratio is stable, we would see mean reverting behaviour. The simple 
form of the target adjustment model states that changes in the debt ratio are explained 
by deviation of the current ratio from a target. Therefore when incorporating transaction 
costs, firms do not automatically adjust their debt level but instead follow a target 
adjustment model, according to which: 
 D it – Dit-1 = β (D
*
it – Dit-1),   0< β < 1    (2) 
The regression specification is  
  ΔDit = α + β(D
*
it – Dit-1) + eit         (3) 
Where D
*
it is the target debt level for firm i at time t. we take β, the target-adjustment 
coefficient (defined as a speed of adjustment), as a sample-wide constant.  If transaction 
is zero, i.e. β=1, then D
*
it – Dit-1 and the firm automatically adjust their debt level to the 
target debt level triggered by the absence of transaction costs. On the contrary, if β=0   10
                                                
then Dit = Dit-1, which implies that transaction costs are so high that no form adjusts it 
debt level, thus remaining in the debt level of the previous period. In intermediate 
situations, where value of β is between 0 and 1, firms adjust their debt level in a way 
that is inversely proportional to the transaction costs. 
 
 4. Data and Methodology 
The firms included in the study are listed firms on the Main Board and Second Board of 
Bursa Malaysia, BM, over the period 1986 to 2001 (16 years). All data on proxies for 
various unobserved attributes are collected from annual accounting data, which are 
extracted from the firm’s annual reports, namely from the audited financial statements
4 
comprising of (i) the balance sheets, (ii) the income statements, and (iii) the cash flow 
statements. Since we are collecting financial data from the audited accounts, the 
consistency, reliability and accuracy of the information is ensured of high quality. The 
bulk of the financial data was obtained from the BM information centre. In addition, the 
year-end share market prices of the sample firms were collected from various issues of 
the Investors Digest.
5 This information is required in the computation of the market 
value of a firm.  
Two restrictions regarding the inclusion of firms have been introduced. First, we 
exclude the financial companies due to its different accounting categories and rules. For 
example, banks, insurance and finance companies are subject to special capital 
adequacy requirements, are highly regulated by the central bank and these companies 
 
4 These firm’s reports are subjected to auditing by certified public accounting firm and shall comply with 
the standard accounting practices and regulations. Malaysian firms follow a variety of reporting standards 
that are congruent with the international standards in many aspects. The stock market is known to be 
Fama-efficient by reference to prior published studies. 
5 The Investors Digest was published by the Bursa Malaysia.   11
have to comply with very stringent legal requirement on financing. Second, in the 
estimation of a dynamic capital structure model, it is required that all sample firms be 
observed at least over five consecutive years within 1986 to 2001 periods. These 
restrictions narrow the data set but it is unavoidable because we want to apply 
unbalanced panel data techniques under the framework of dynamic analysis. Given 
these restrictions and after dropping firms with incomplete data, the final data set 
consists of 182 companies comprises of 91 distressed companies and 91 non-distressed 
(or healthy) companies. The matching of these non-affecting companies was done based 
on the similar sector and firm’s size.  
Besides, the aggregate macroeconomics data such as (i) economic growth, (ii) 
money supply, (iii) exchange rates, (iv) interest rates, and (v) inflation rates are gathered 
from various issues of Bank Negara Malaysia’s annual reports. 
 
Description of Methodology 
The theoretical model of capital structure, which is a function of internal and external 
variables, can be written in its simple general forms as: 
Di = f (Internal & External) = f (Xij; Yij)…  … … … (4) 
Where, 
Di    =    Firm’s debt ratio; 
Internal:  internal factors such as firm specific characteristics; and  
External:  external factors such as macroeconomic conditions. 
The regressors in Equation (4) can be broadly categorized into two groups, i.e.  (i) 
internal factors ( X1, X2, X3, ….X13) which are the firm-specific characteristics and (ii) 
external factors ( ), which are the macroeconomics variables.   18 16 14 , , , X X X L  12
  Capital structure decisions are dynamic by nature and should be modelled as 
such in empirical analysis. Many earlier empirical studies on the determinants of capital 
structure decision have tended to limit to static modelling. Estimating parameters under 
such a static framework, in fact, relies on the strong assumption that all the coefficients 
of any possible lagged variables are not different from zero. This assumption restricts 
the importance of previous period’s exogenous variable so that they have no impact at 
all on current adjustment. Econometrically, this blinkered analysis would only reveal 
short-run determinants. Therefore, to provide additional insight into the long-run capital 
structure determinants and the adjustment process toward optimal capital structure, this 
study extends the empirical research on the dynamic of capital structure decisions and 
the nature of adjustment process. Under the dynamic framework, the present study will 
estimates the dynamic capital structure model by employing a much stronger GMM 
estimation technique as proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond 
(1991).  
To illustrate, we consider a linear dynamic fixed effects model of the form: 
it i it t i it X Y Y ε α β ρ + + + = −
'
1 ,       (The original dynamic model)   (5) 
To remove the individual fixed effects component,  i α  from the original dynamic model, 
they first difference Equation (5) to obtain: 




2 , 1 , 1 , ) ( ) ( − − − − − − + − + − = − t i it t i it t i t i t i it X X Y Y Y Y ε ε β ρ
       (The first differenced form) …  (6) 
Equation (6) can be rewritten as: 
it it it it X Y Y ε β ρ Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ −1   … … … … … (7)   13
Notice that Equation (7) cancels the individual fixed effects, in which we assumed to be 
possibly correlated with the exogenous variables,   (Detail Derivation of 
the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991) in Appendix 1).  
0 ) (
' ≠ i it X E α
 
5. Results and Discussions 
Factors Correlated with Capital Structure 
The results are presented in this section. The statistics relating to the samples are 
summarised in Table 2. The panel data relate to 182 firms (91 distressed and 91 healthy 
firms) and the data are annual time series over 1986-2001. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
  For comparative purposes, this study estimated the dynamic capital structure 
model using three different methods: (i) OLS; (ii) Anderson-Hsiao (AH); and (iii) 
GMM (Arellano and Bond approach). These estimates are heteroscedaticity consistent 
where the covariance matrix is adjusted using White’s correction. The results and 
diagnostic tests are reported in Table 3. The data covers the period of 1986-2001. 
However, the estimation period was reduced to 1988-2001 for both the GMM and the 
AH estimates as a result of losing two cross-sections in constructing one lag for each 
variable and for taking first differences for the instruments.  
Besides, the fixed effects in both models are eliminated by first differencing and 
treating all the variables including the lagged dependent variable as endogenous: see 
Ozkan (2001). One example of potential endogeneity problem is as follows. If the 
leverage of a firm increases, one could then observe a negative relation between 
leverage and the market-to-book ratio, assuming leverage decreases a firm’s market 
value since increased capital structure increases financial risk. This study thus employs 
an instrumental variable estimation technique, specifically GMM, where all variables,   14
                                                
including the lagged dependent variable, are treated as endogenous (Wooldridge 2002 p. 
50).  
In Model 3, which gives the pooled OLS estimates, the lagged dependent 
variable is treated as exogenous and thus the unobservable fixed effects on the firm 
remain. The study reports five test statistics as follows: First order autocorrelation 
(Correlation-1) and Second order autocorrelation (Correlation-2) of residuals, which is 
asymptotically distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation; Wald test 1 is a Wald test of joint significance of the estimated 
coefficients, which is asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis 
of no relationship; Wald test 2 is a Wald test of the joint significance of the time 
dummies; and Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically 
distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of instrument validity (Sargan, 1976).  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Comparing the GMM and AH estimates, it can be seen that the coefficient 
estimates, including those for the lagged dependent variable, under  GMM are 
determined better. The GMM results reveal substantially small variance (standard error) 
than that for the AH, suggesting a gain in efficiency compared to the AH estimate.
6 This 
is consistent with the findings of Arellano and Bond (1991). Also, there is evidence that 
the OLS level specification is inappropriate for estimating the dynamic model. First, the 
serial correlation tests reveal that the assumption of uncorrelated errors is violated, 
which suggests some degree of misspecification. Second, there is a strong evidence of 
an upward bias on the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in OLS level 
specification. The estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable under OLS is 
0.686 compared to 0.529 under the GMM specification. This is unsurprising since the 
 
6 15 out of 21 GMM standard errors are smaller than AH.   15
lagged dependent variable is expected to be biased upward due to correlation with the 
unobservable fixed effects in the residual term of OLS model. This result can also be 
seen as an indication of the presence of firm-specific effects (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
When these firm-specific effects exist and are unobservable, OLS estimation in levels 
leads to an omitted variables bias because of the potential correlation between fixed 
effects and the included regressors.   
In addition, the diagnostic tests show that the Wald test of the joint significance 
of the regressors and the time dummies are both significant at the 0.01 level. Secondly, 
the correlation test results for the presence of first order correlation and the absence of 
the second order correlation also fulfilled the GMM requirement at 0.01 level. In fact, 
the presence of the negative first order autocorrelation is expected and the absence of 
the second order autocorrelation is important for the consistency of the GMM estimators 
when the lagged variables are instrumental. Finally, the Sargan test reveals that the 
instruments used in the GMM estimation may not valid. The result shows that the null 
of the instrument validity is rejected at the 0.01 level. However, this is not critical as 
Arellano and Bond (1991) noted that the Sargan test has a tendency to reject too often in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity. Therefore, based on all the test results and arguments, 
this study concluded that GMM estimation is preferred as a dynamic model 
specification for capital structure. In summary, the GMM estimates and test results are 
robust. 
The coefficient of determination, R
2, and its adjusted value are routinely used in 
most regression models both as a measure of goodness of fit and as a criterion for model 
selection. However, there are problems of using 
2 R  in a regression model estimated by 
the instrumental variable methods: see Pesaran and Smith (1994). As an alternative, 
there are two possible indicators of goodness of fit, namely Pesaran and Smith (1994)   16
generalised R-squared commonly denoted as  , and the square of the correlation 
between predicted and actual values of the change in dependent variable of GMM 
estimation. This study used the second measure because it is more common and less 
complex to compute. The results of the goodness of fit of GMM models are shown in 
Table 4. 
2 GR
(Insert Table 4 here) 
The statistics indicates that there is evidence of different goodness of fit for the 
different capital structure models. The best three models in term of goodness of fit are 
for Lev2 (short-term leverage, book value), Lev6 (Total debt leverage) and Lev4 (short-
term debt, market value) models. For example, the explanatory variables in the capital 
structure model of Lev2 could explain 26.84 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable. The analysis of the estimated coefficient emphasizes the results of the market 
value model because theoretical literature of capital structure is not discussed in book 
value but it was always referred to in term of market value.  
The estimation shows a positive coefficient for lagged leverage. The results 
indicate that the firms adjust to long-term financial targets. As shown by Shayam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), this can well be consistent with a pecking order of financing 
activities. The distressed company dummies, which are designed to test whether 
financially distressed firms have significantly higher leverage than non-financially 
distressed firms, is significantly positive. The parameter estimate of the NDTS is 
negative and statistically significant in two of the market models, which is similar to the 
findings in DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). It confirms that the firms rather utilize other 
tax shields that be involve in the issuance of debt. Hence, tax shield is not an important 
incentive for the firms to increase leverage. The relationship between the tangibility 
(X2) and long-term debts turns out to be significantly positive for the long-term market   17
value model. This finding is similar to those for the developed countries, US and OECD 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) which suggests that firms use 
tangible assets as collateral when negotiating borrowing especially long-term borrowing.  
  The estimated coefficient for firm size in all market value models is positively 
significant. This is consistent with the findings of many prior empirical studies (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al. 2001; Frank and Goyal, 2002). The direct relationship 
is valid regardless of the source or maturity of the debt. The effect of growth 
opportunities on long-term debt is significantly negative at 0.10 percent level for the 
market value model. It means that companies with growth opportunities are forced to 
resort to short-term debt financing and thus this resulted in mismatch in financing their 
investments. The auditor’s opinion dummy variables has a significantly negative 
relationship with leverage in two of the market value model, which is contradicting with 
the general expectation that firms with clean report could have excess loan easily from 
the financial institutions. However, this can be interpreted to mean that once the 
company obtained a clean report, it provides positive signals to the market, as a results, 
investors invest more in the company through equity participation, and this lowers the 
leverage of the firm. 
  The influence of firm under receivership on long-term debt is found to be 
positive and significant at 0.05 level for the market model. At first this result is puzzling 
because it conflicts with the general expectation that firms with receivers would usually 
face difficult time when asking for loans. However, circumstantial evidence shows that 
firm with receivers received special assistance to avoid bankruptcy because of the 
financial crisis. If the firm goes bankrupt, not only the shareholders would suffer, but 
also it would have a systematic risk on banking institutions, hence the support and 
rescue.      18
                                                
  For the deficit in shareholders’ equity as a determinant of capital structure, the 
result reveals that the estimated coefficients of these dummy variables are positive and 
significant at 0.10 level. An increase in the level of deficit in shareholder’s equity 
always increases the level of debts. This is another interesting finding because it 
indicates that the distressed firm resorts to debt financing to restore itself and finance its 
business operations although the firms are in bad shape. This finding also confirmed the 
notion of moral hazard
7 related to excessive loans in the banking system as postulated 
by Krugman (1998) in explaining the genesis of the financial crisis. 
  The estimated coefficient for GDP is negative and is significantly related at 0.01 
level to leverage in two of the market value models. This result indicates that during the 
period of low growth, firms borrow more. This financing behavior could be due to the 
profitability factor. It means that during economic downturns, the number of profitable 
investments declines and firms tend to increase short-term borrowing to maintain 
normal dividend policy. The money supply coefficient is negative and significant at the 
0.01 level in two of the market value model results. The inverse relationship means that 
as the money supply reduced, the firm increased their level of leverage. This indicates 
that the monetary policy via reduced money supply did not affect much the costs of 
borrowing, at least for the troubled firms as hey were treated with softer-term loans to 
save them. This financing behavior persists probably due to survival reason in particular 
for distressed firms after the crisis.  Thus, this survival factor has increased the level of 
leverage despite the cost of funds increasing. The interest rate coefficient is negative 
and significant at the 0.01 level with the long-term debt of market value model. The 
inverse relationship implies that as the interest rate increases, firm resorted to less long-
term debt. 
 
7 Krugman argued that a system of implicit guarantees and not very transparent credit assessment lead to 
incentive to choose the highest return investment regardless of risk.    19
  The exchange rate coefficient is positive and significant in all the market value 
models. This indicates that when there is an exchange rate appreciation, firms increase 
their level of debt. Due to exchange rate appreciation, firm, which used imported raw 
materials as input, will not need to pay extra in order to get the same amount of 
materials.  
 
The Speed of Adjustment 
As discussed in an earlier section, the speed of adjustment (β) is defined as one minus 
the value of the estimated coefficient of the lag leverage variable in the dynamic capital 
structure model. The values of the speeds of adjustment by maturity of debt were 
estimated: see Table 5. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
The results indicate that a differential speeds of adjustment for short-term and long-term 
borrowing. Besides, the speed of adjustment at book value is consistently higher than 
the speed of adjustment using market values. The speeds of adjustment for short-term, 
long-term, and total debt using market values are 0.427, 0.408, and 0.471 respectively. 
Since the speed of adjustment is inversely proportional to the transaction costs, it 
implies that it is costly to achieve optimal capital structure. In addition, the results show 
that any interpretations are sensitive to the exact definition of leverage employed in the 
model because the speed of adjustment differs significantly across regressions.  
The results of the speed of adjustment are compared with the findings on similar 
research in the US, UK, Germany and other developed countries. However, caution has 
to be exercised in comparing the results because of structural differences of the different 
general microstructure and banking institutions of countries. Comparing the results in 
Table 6, it seems that the adjustment process (value of speed of adjustment is 0.47 in   20
this study is about 14.41 percent slower than in Spain, the US, the UK and Germany. 
For example, De Miguel and Pindado (2001) found a high speed of adjustment of 0.79 
for Spain, which is due to low transaction costs when borrowing funds in Spain. Since 
for Spanish firms, bank credit is important and represents the main source of credit to 
Spanish firms, such financing also leads to lower agency costs between creditors and 
shareholders. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) obtained a value of 0.59 for the US, 
Ozkan (2001) obtained a value of 0.55 for the UK. Kremp et al. (1999) documented a 
value of 0.53 for Germany. As for France, the speed of adjustment is 0.29 (Gaud at al., 
2003), which is comparable to that of Swtizerland with 0.28 as reported by Kremp et al. 
(1999). These values were derived using healthy firms and balanced panel data 
regressions: our results are for distressed firms included using unbalanced panel. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
The Long Run Parameters 
One advantage of applying the dynamic capital structure model is that we can arrive at 
the long-term coefficients. The long-run values are then obtained by dividing each 
estimated coefficient on the right hand side of the dynamic regression equation by one 
minus the value of the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The 
results reported above showed that the coefficient of the lagged total debt variable is 
0.529. This means that the firm maintains 52.90 percent of the debt they had in the last 
year and changed only 47.06 percent. Also note that subtracting from 1 (1-0.529), we 
get 0.471. This value is about equal to multiplying each short-term coefficient by 2.125 
(the constant in the model). Therefore in Table 7, the long-term parameter of the 
variable X6 would therefore be 0.135 (see Lev6), not 0.063 as reported earlier tables, 
which is the short-term coefficient. The long-run parameters of all the dynamic capital 
structure models are derived in the same manner and as shown in Table 7.   21
(Insert Table 7 here) 
So far, the parameters estimated by the capital structure model reported in the 
literature have only been short-term ones, especially in this tested market. This statistics 
is a seriously underestimated value of the impact of the explanatory variables in the 
long-term perspective, which is what the Miller-Modigliani proposition is all about. The 
new evidence from this study clearly indicates the underestimation of the short-term 
coefficient relative to the more important longer term coefficients. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study investigates the capital structure determinants and speed of adjustment to 
target debt ratio by firms under distress and firms not under distress. Both firm specific 
and macroeconomics variables were used for the first time in the modelling using new 
dynamic capital structure model because the inclusion of financially distressed firm 
sample necessitated the use of macroeconomic factors. The empirical results reveal 
interesting findings and shed new insights in the financing behavior of firms. The 
findings are similar to those documented in developed countries and are consistent with 
a few of the capital structure theories.  
We find the results from this dynamic model is superior compared with the results 
from prior capital structure studies in a number of ways. First, the model accommodates 
the possibility that the firms may not be at their optimal capital structure at any point in 
time. Therefore, it is possible to identify the determinants of optimal capital structure 
rather than observed capital structure, the latter being the approach taken in the 
empirical literature. Second, this study also estimated the speed at which firms adjust 
their leverage towards their target capital structure. Finally, under the dynamic 
framework, this study could obtain estimates for the long-run coefficient of the capital   22
structure instead of the estimates by the static model which are strictly short term 
estimates.  
The dynamic analysis is conducted using a combination of GMM and instrumental 
variable approaches. Under the GMM, the Anderson and Hsiao (AH) and Arrelano and 
Bond (AB) methods were employed to estimate the dynamic capital structure models. 
The results from the dynamic models are also compared to those obtained from the 
pooled OLS estimation simply to document the errors in the OLS method as an 
inappropriate method for target capital structure measurement. This study concluded 
that the Arellano and Bond’s method is the most appropriate approach for estimating 
capital structure adjustment estimators with least variances, suggesting that there is a 
gain in efficiency compared to Anderson and Hsiao’s approach.   
On the determinants of capital structure choice the results are as follows: lagged 
leverage (Lev-1), distressed firm (DC), NDTS (X1), firm size (X6), auditor’s opinion 
(X8), deficit in shareholders’ equity (X12), GDP (ME1), money supply (ME2), and 
exchange rates (ME4). We find that NDTS (X1), the lagged leverage (Lev-1), and 
money supply (ME2) are the three most significant determinants of the financing 
decision in the tested market. That there exists a target level of leverage is again 
documented. However, the adjustment process is shown to be slow comparatively with 
developed countries. This could be due to the relative inefficiency of lending 
institutions compared to those in developed countries. Besides, it seems that the cost of 
deviating from the optimal leverage is not large enough to motivate costly external 
capital market transactions. Instead, leverage is slowly changed by resorting to internal 
financing sources such as retained earning most of the time, a result consistent with the 
pecking order theory of financing. In addition, the results also show that any 
interpretations of results depend crucially on the exact definition of leverage used in the   23
model – book value versus market value - because the speed of adjustment differs 
significantly across specifications and also across the type of financial conditions.     24
Appendix 1 
To illustrate how the AB estimation technique performs, we consider the dynamic 
model to be estimated in level as follows: 
it i it t i it X Y Y ε α β ρ + + + = −
'
1 ,   … … … … … (A1) 





, 2 , 1 , 1 , , ) ( ) ( − − − − − − + − + − = − t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i X X Y Y Y Y ε ε β ρ  … (A2) 
Rewritten Equation (A2), we have: 
it it it it X Y Y ε β ρ Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ −1   … … … … … (A3) 
For each year, now we look for a set of instruments available for instrumenting the 
difference equation as in Equation (A3).  
For t = 3, the dynamic equation to be estimated is: 




3 1 , 2 2 3 i i i i i i i i X X Y y Y Y ε ε β ρ − + − + − = −   … … (A4) 
or 
3 3 2 3 i i i i X Y Y ε β ρ Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ   … … … … … (A5) 
Where the instruments (again assuming X being at least predetermined)  ,   and 
 are available to be used for the estimation. 





For t = 4, the equation is: 
4 4 3 4 i i i i X Y Y ε β ρ Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ   … … … … … (A6) 







As can be seen, when the time periods for instrumentation enlarge, the set of instrument 
available also extended. Therefore for the equation in the final period T: 
iT iT iT iT X Y Y ε β ρ Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ −1   … …   … (A7) 






1 2 , 2 1 , , , , , , , , − − T i i i T i i i X X X Y Y Y K K  
To enhance the validity of GMM estimation, the study also used heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent covariance matrices. 
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Table 1 
Explanatory Variables and Their Expected relationship with Leverage Factor 
Authors   Variables 
Code 







X1 Non-Debt  Tax 
Shields (NTDS) 
The ratio of annual depreciation 
expenses to total assets, as a proxy 
for NDTS 
-  Previous studies indicated that firms, 
which have high NDTS, are likely to 
use less debt. 
Johnson (1997)  X2  Tangibility  Fixed asset ratio is used to measure 
the value of tangibility 
+  higher the value of tangible assets a 
firm owned, the more likely that a firm 
will have a high leverage ratio 
Titman and 
Wessels (1988) 
X3 Profitability  The  proxy  used for profitability is 
return on assets (ROA) 
-  Highly profitable firms should have a 
smaller debt ratio 
Mehran(1992) and 
Johnson (1997) 
X4 Business  Risk  defined  as  the standard deviation of 
the firm operating income 
-  High-risk companies have lower 
borrowing 
Ohlson(1978)  X5 Probability  of 
Bankruptcy 
Ohlson’s O-score as a measure of 
likelihood of bankruptcy 
-  Firms with a high score value should be 
forced to borrow less 
Titman and 
Wessels (1988) 
X6  Size of Firm  Natural logarithm of total assets as a 
proxy for the size 
+  
Whited (1992)  X7  Growth 
Opportunities 
market value to the book value of 
asset  
±   
PN4 Criteria  X8  Auditors’ opinion Any qualified or negative report 
would be interpreted as increasing 
in the business risk of a firm 
  Introduce by Malaysian government 
and Security commission to prevent 
bankruptcy 
Emilio (2001)  X9  Managerial 
Ownership 
Percentage of shares held by the 
directors 
-  Proportion of management’s ownership 
increase, the more the interest of 
shareholders and management are 
aligned 
Berger et al.  1997 X10  Size of Board of 
Directors 
The natural logarithm of the number 
of directors 
+  A positive relation between the size of 
board directors and leverage.    30 
Continued 
Authors   Variables 
Code 





PN4 Criteria  X11  Receivers  It  is set to one if receiver or 
managers had been appointed over 
the firm 
-  Introduce by Malaysian government 
and Security commission to prevent 
bankruptcy 
PN4 Criteria  X12  Deficit  in 
Shareholders’ Equity
It is set to one if the firm has a 
deficit shareholders’ equity 
+  Introduce by Malaysian government 
and Security commission to prevent 
bankruptcy 
Ozkan (2001)  X13  Gross  Domestic 
Product 
Real GDP as proxy for economic 
growth 
+  During the good time, the firm resort 
to debt financing to finance their 
expansion programs 
Ozkan (2001)  X14  Money Supply  Annual change of M2 to represent 
the money supply 
-  The increase in money supply would 
boost the liquidity in the market and 
eventually reduce the effective 
interest rates 
Ozkan (2001)  X15  Interest Rates  The BLR of commercial banks 
used as the proxy for interest rates 
- The  BLR for commercial banks is 
chosen because the bulk of the 
Malaysian corporate sector loans are 
obtained from commercial banks 
Ozkan (2001)  X16  Exchange Rates  Trade-weighted  nominal  effective 
exchange rate (NEER) to proxy for 
exchange rates 





X17  Inflation  Rates  CPI is measured as a proxy for 
inflation 
+  During an inflationary period, firm 
employs more debt in their capital 
structure as the real cost of debt falls 
The lagged D will be used as another independent variable in addition to the 17 specified in the table.   31
 
Table 2 
The Statistics Relating to the Samples in the Panel Data 
Number of Firms  Number of observations  Number of record 
on each firms 
Distressed   Healthy  Total  Distressed  Healthy   Total 
5 4  18  22  20  90  110 
6 13  13  26  78  78  156 
7 5  11  16  35  77  112 
8 9  12  21  72  96  168 
9 8  7  15  72  63  135 
10 8  5  13  80  50  130 
11 10  3  13  110  33  143 
12 6  3  9  72  36  108 
13 3  1  4  39  13  52 
14 2  0  2  28  0  28 
15 0  1  1  0  15  15 
16 23  17  40  368  272  640 
Total 91  91  182  974  823  1797 
Notes: We used the Winsorian criterion of 2.5% level to control the effect of the outlier effect.    32
Table 3 Estimation of target capital structure under three alternative methods 
Ind. Dependent  Variable:  Lev6 
Var.  Model 1: GMM  Model 2: AH  Model 3: OLS 
Lev6(-1) 0.529 ***  0.485 ***  0.686 ***
   (0..051)    (0.169)    (0.027   
DC 0.0000 *  0.000 *  0.015 * 
   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.008)   
X1 -1.0288 *  -1.009 *  -0.537 ** 
   (0.532)    (0.572)    (0.226)   
X2  0.048    0.008    0.046 ** 
   (0.058)    (0.061)    (0.020)   
X3  -0.002    -0.010    -0.036 ***
   (0.020)    (0.021)    (0.012)   
X4  0.003    0.002    0.004 ** 
   (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.002)   
X5  0.0466    0.0419    0.0151   
   (0.0497)    (0.0541)    (0.0310)   
X6 0.0633 ***  0.0745 ***  0.0331 ***
   (0.0184)    (0.0212)    (0.0042)   
X7  0.0007    0.0022    -0.0011   
   (0.0023)    (0.0026)    (0.0012)   
X8 -0.0788 ***  -0.0544 ***  -0.0681 ***
   (0.0219)    (0.0256)    (0.0132)   
X9  0.0112    -0.0026    0.0103   
   (0.0200)    (0.0298)    (0.0074)   
X10  -0.0050    -0.0003    -0.0151   
 






X11  0.0216    0.0027    0.0008   
   (0.0428)    (0.0510)    (0.0221)   
X13 0.0837 *  0.1176 *  0.0305    
   (0.0507)    (0.0624)    (0.0253)   
γ1  -0.0092 *** -0.0093 ***  0.0039 ***
   (0.0028)    (0.0032)    (0.0014)   
γ2  -0.0992 *** -0.0949 ***  0.0167 ** 
   (0.0231)    (0.0189)    (0.0072)   
γ3  -0.0271    -0.0375 *  0.0000   
   (0.0256)    (0.0225)    (0.0000)   
γ4  0.0654 *** 0.0699 ***  0.0000    
   (0.0124)    (0.0100)    (0.0000)   
γ5  0.0066    0.0152    -0.0638 ***
   (0.0435)    (0.0282)    (0.0107)   
Corr. 1  -6.3410 ***  -3.7560 ***  -1.3410   
Corr. 2  1.6480    1.8490    2.75 ***
Wald test 1  651.20 ***  755.70 ***  7,602.00 ***
Wald test 2   426.60 ***  406.70 ***  398.20 ***
Sargan test   206.70 ***  NR     NR    
Notes: ***-significance at 1% level, **-significance at 5% level, *-significance at 10% level. NR- Not 
relevant.   33
 
Table 4:  
The Results of the Goodness of Fit of GMM Models 
Independent Variables  Dependent Variables 
  Book Value  Market Value 
 Lev1  Lev2  Lev3 Lev4  Lev5  Lev6 
Correlations 
(PCLev, CLev) 
.0001 0.268 .019  0.136 .0002  0.250 
 
Table 5:   
Speed of Adjustment by Maturity of Debts 
   Dependent Variable 
   Book Value  Market Value 
   Lev1 Lev2 Lev3 Lev4 Lev5  Lev6 
Speed of Adjustment  0.559 1.250 0.896 0.427 0.408  0.471 
 
Table 6:   
Comparison of Speed of Adjustment by Countries 
Country  Speed of   Reference 
      Adjustment   
1  Spain  0.79  De Miguel and Pindado (2001) 
2  US  0.59  Shyan-Sunder and Myer (1999) 
3 UK  0.55  Ozkan  (2001) 
4  Germany  0.53  Kremp at al (1999) 
5  Malaysia 0.47   Isa, Taufiq, Shamsher & Annuar (2005) 
6  Switzerland  0.29  Gaud at al (2005) 
7  France  0.28  Kremp at al (1999) 
   34
Table 7 
The Long-Run Parameters of the Dynamic Capital Structure Model 
Ind. Dependent  Variable 
Var.  Book Value  Market Value 
    Lev1  Lev2 Lev3 Lev4 Lev5 Lev6 
Lev  (-1)  0.788 -0.199 0.117 1.161 1.447 1.125
DC 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000
X1 -53.04  7.51 36.99 -0.344 -1.56  -2.186
X2  -3.394 -0.246 -4.608 -0.055 0.137 0.102
X3 1.128  0.198 3.04 -0.042 0.030  -0.004
X4 -0.279  0.005 -0.174 0.003 0.003  0.007
X5 0.594  0.438 0.251 0.057 0.072  0.099
X6 0.503  0.064 0.509 0.066 0.048  0.135
X7 -0.113  0.004 -0.067 0.005 -0.004  0.002
X8 0.597  -0.032 0.331 -0.157 -0.004  -0.167
X9  -1.86 -0.083 -1.432 0.030 -0.040 0.024
X10 29.05  0.144 21.69 -0.207 0.317  -0.177
X11 0.570  -0.066 -1.138 0.016 -0.020  -0.011
X12  9.38 -0.067 4.966 -0.017 0.096 0.046
X13 14.21  0.074 12.507 0.011 -0.044  -0.045
X14 -2.00  0.100 -1.032 0.202 -0.100  0.178
γ1  0.037 0.002 0.106 -0.012 -0.002  -0.020
γ2  0.151 0.005 0.829 -0.134 -0.030  -0.211
γ3  -0.307 -0.019 -0.542 -0.032 -0.073  -0.058
γ4  0.258 0.013 0.443 0.116 0.045  0.139
γ5  0.134 0.036 1.73 0.077 0.045  0.014
  Note: Lev1 … Lev7 indicates different definitions of leverage used in this study. 